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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE CITY WAS ESTOPPED 
FROM APPLYING ITS ZONING REGULATIONS TO HUGOES' 
PROPERTY. 
A. Standard and Burden of Proof for Zoning Estoppel 
The Hugoes note that the doctrine of zoning estoppel is firmly embedded and 
widely followed in Utah law. Br. of Appellees at 22 (citing Western Land Equities, Inc. 
v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah 1980)). However, the Utah Supreme Court 
has noted that only under exceptional circumstances should estoppel, waiver or laches 
constitute a defense against alleged violations of zoning laws. Utah County v. Young, 
615 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1980) (citing Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136 
(Utah 1976)).1 The Hugoes have failed to meet this burden in establishing zoning 
estoppel and the trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that the facts 
presented at trial were legally sufficient to support a finding of zoning estoppel. 
As the parties and trial court have agreed, the standard for establishing zoning 
estoppel in Utah requires: (1) an act or omission; (2) upon which a party reasonably and 
in good faith relied; (3) in making substantial changes in position or incurring extensive 
expenses; (4) that it would be highly inequitable to deprive the owner of his right to 
1
 See also, Jackson v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 733 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Alaska 
1987); Town of Aha v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 802 (noting that "[zjoning 
ordinances are governmental acts which rest upon the police power, and as to violations 
thereof any inducements, reliances, negligence of enforcement, or like factors are merely 
aggravations of the violation rather than excuses or justifications therefor") (citing Salt 
Lake City v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138 (Utah 1976) (citations omitted)). 
complete his proposed development. Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 
(Utah App. 1992); Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980). 
B. Mayor's Actions Not Sufficient Grounds for Estoppel 
The Hugoes cite to the findings of the trial court regarding assurances by a former 
Mayor and the Hugoes' reliance on such assurances in support of the trial court's 
imposition of zoning estoppel in this case. Br. of Appellees at 23. The specific finding 
of the trial court was that "Mr. Branch and Mr. Fleming had several conversations with 
the then Mayor, Mr. Argyle, and attended several public meetings where they were 
encouraged to consent to the annexation, with the assurance that they would be able to 
continue the current use of their property." (R. at 249).2 Even if the trial court found that 
the Mayor's comments constituted assurances to the property owners, the weight and 
legal effect given to such comments was erroneously considered an act or omission on 
the part of the City sufficient to support a finding of zoning estoppel. 
First, the Mayor has no authority to bind the City regarding matters of zoning. 
Absent such authority, reliance on comments made by the mayor or other city officials is 
not reasonable or sufficient to support a finding of estoppel. In Morrison v. Home, 363 
2
 The testimony at trial from Mr. Branch regarding his conversations with the 
Mayor was: "We asked him if we could ~ if we annexed in if we could go on with our 
things. And he said that he didn't think that would be a problem." (Transcript of Trial at 
8). Later in the trial, Mr. Branch said about the Mayor's comments: "He said that he 
didn't think it would be a problem. That we could do what we had intended to do with 
our property." (Transcript of Trial at 12). 
2 
P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1961) the Utah Supreme Court noted "[i]t would be unreasonable 
and unrealistic to conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer having no authority to do 
so, could bind the County to a variation of a zoning ordinance duly passed, to which 
everyone has notice by its passage and publication." Although distinguished by the 
Hugoes, the holding in Home may be relevant to City representatives, whether 
ministerial or not, as City officials do not have the authority to bind the City to any given 
action absent compliance with proper procedures. Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 
188, 189 (Utah 1984) (court noted that county zoning authority are bound by the terms 
and standards of the applicable zoning ordinance and are not at liberty to either grant or 
deny a conditional use permit in derogation of legislative standards) (citing Thurston v. 
Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 444-45 (Utah 1984).3 
In addition, courts have held erroneous information given by City officials 
insufficient to support a finding of zoning estoppel. Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 
283 (Utah App. 1994); Utah v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Maloofv. Gwinett 
County, 200 S.E. 2d 749 (Ga. 1973).4 In Stucker, this Court held that a letter from the 
3
 See also, Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 92 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1939) 
(court noted that board of adjustment has no power to authorize a nonconforming use in 
contravention of zoning ordinances of the city); Springville Citizens For A Better 
Community v. City ofSpringville, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (March 19, 1999) (court struck 
down an action by the city council approving a planned unit development for failure to 
comply with approval procedures set forth in its own ordinances). 
4
 See also previous discussion regarding this issue as set forth in Brief of 
Appellant at 14-15. 
3 
director of the planning office regarding development of a particular lot was not grounds 
for estoppel, even though the owner purchased the lot in reliance on the letter. Stucker, 
870 P.2d at 290. Given the legal standard required for imposing zoning estoppel, the 
Mayor's comments relied upon by the trial court in this case do not support or justify a 
finding of estoppel and should be set aside. 
C. Zoning Administrator's Actions or Inaction Not Sufficient for Estoppel 
The Hugoes cite to the findings of the trial court regarding the actions or inaction 
by the Zoning Administrator and the Hugoes' reliance on such action or inaction in 
support of the trial court's imposition of zoning estoppel in this case. Br. of Appellees at 
23. The finding of a duty on the part of the Zoning Administrator and the weight and 
legal effect given to his actions or inaction in this case were erroneously concluded by 
the trial court to constitute an act or omission sufficient to support a finding of zoning 
estoppel. R. at 249-53. 
Just because a property owner comes in to talk with City officials regarding the 
zoning of his or her property and the permitted uses in such zone does not mean that the 
City is put on notice as to what the property owner wants to do with his or her property.5 
There are any number of different uses the Hugoes can undertake for use of their 
property. It is not until the City receives a completed application for a particular 
5
 In addition, just because Tim Stephens knew that the Hugoes owned a trucking 
business, does not necessarily establish that he knew they intended to use the property for 
that business or for the purpose of parking trucks. 
4 
development or use that it is accurately put on notice of the use to be made of the 
property. It is agreed that property owners should be given as much accurate information 
as possible when inquiring of certain property and uses in the City and that the City 
should respond in good faith and with diligence to such inquiries. But the legal import 
and burden suggested by the trial court to be placed on local officials in responding to or 
disseminating information regarding hypothetical or preliminary inquiries should not be 
imposed. Such a legal burden will significantly limit the candid discussion zoning staff 
are currently able to have with property owners. Maloofv. Gwinnett County, 200 S.E.2d 
749 (Ga. 1973); Jackson v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 733 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1987). 
Finally, "tacit" approval by a zoning administrator regarding a proposed use of 
property should not be construed to constitute approval. Such a conclusion would render 
meaningless local entities' application and approval processes. If a property owner can 
get approval of a certain use of his or her property by discussing the matter with zoning 
staff under the guise of estoppel or otherwise, there would be no need for the application 
process.6 The approval process is a needed step to permit the local governmental entity 
to obtain complete and accurate information regarding a proposed use, to sufficiently 
study and analyze the proposed use, and to determine if such use is permitted in the 
6
 See previously cited cases regarding authority of a mayor to bind the city and 
requirement to follow own procedural ordinances as applicable to zoning administrator's 
authority and duty. Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1984); Walton v. 
Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 92 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1939); Springville Citizens For A 
Better Community v. City of Springville, 365 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (March 19, 1999). 
5 
applicable zone. Such a process in the instant case would have resolved any inaccurate 
or erroneous impressions gained by the property owner. 
D. Reliance on Neighbor's Use Not Sufficient for Estoppel 
The Hugoes cite the trial court's conclusion that the Hugoes satisfied any duty of 
inquiry by inspecting the property and rely on the fact that neighboring properly was 
being used for similar purposes in support of the trial court's imposition of zoning 
estoppel. Br. of Appellees at 25. R. at 253-54. The Hugoes'reliance on what other 
property owners in the area were doing with their property does not support a finding of 
zoning estoppel and the trial court erred as a matter of law in so concluding. 
Visual inspection of adjacent properties is not reasonable information to rely upon 
in establishing estoppel. Many of the uses in the vicinity of the Hugoe property were 
illegal uses and the City has commenced enforcement action on various property owners 
in the area. Transcript of Trial at 118-121. Even without such enforcement actions, any 
failure on the part of the City to enforce violations of other property owners does not bar 
the City from enforcing its ordinances against the Hugoes. Utah County v. Young, 615 
P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 
1992). In addition, other uses observed by the Hugoes may be legal nonconforming uses 
or such properties may be located in different zones under the City zoning ordinance. 
Thus, reliance on the neighbors' use of their property in this case is not reasonable or 
sufficient to support the imposition of zoning estoppel against the City. 
6 
E. Reliance on Issuance of Fill Permit Not Sufficient for Estoppel 
The Hugoes also cite to their reliance on the issuance of the fill permit in support 
of the trial court's finding of zoning estoppel. Br. of Appellees at 24-25. Reliance on 
the issuance of the fill permit is not reasonable or sufficient to support zoning estoppel in 
this case. The fill permit granted the Hugoes the right to conduct fill activities on the 
property. It did not, nor could it, permit the Hugoes to conduct any type of "use" on the 
property even if the City staff knew of any intended use of the property by the Hugoes. 
In Kiker v. City of Riverside, 154 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. 1967), cited by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Young, the court held that the city was not estopped from obtaining injunctive relief 
for a use not authorized by the zoning ordinance even though the city had issued a 
business permit and business license for the property. Young, 615 P.2d at 1267.7 In the 
case at hand, the City issued the fill permit to the Hugoes in good faith. Not having an 
application for any specific use for the property before them, the City staff acted 
appropriately in merely issuing the Hugoes a fill permit. 
Although the City should attempt in good faith to inform property owners of the 
requirements of applicable zoning ordinances, the burden suggested by the trial court 
imposes a heightened burden on City employees to foresee what a property owner may 
want to do with his or her property. In the instant case, at the time the Hugoes applied 
7
 The issuance of a business license to the property owner in the Utah case of 
Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp. was not grounds for invoking estoppel against the city 
in enforcing its zoning ordinance. Town of Aha, 836 P.2d at 803. 
7 
for the fill permit, they could have just been filling their property to get it ready to sell. 
Reliance on the issuance of a fill permit in this case is not reasonable to support the trial 
court's imposition of zoning estoppel. 
F. Zoning Estoppel Case Law Distinguished 
The Hugoes cite the case of Wood v. Utah County Board of Adjustments, 390 P.2d 
859 (Utah 1964) for discussion of economic hardship imposed on a property owner 
whose use of the property is thwarted. Br. of Appellees at 22. The economic hardship 
cited by the court in Wood is much more substantial than the hardship established by the 
Hugoes. Specifically, the court in Wood notes that if the county ordinance requiring 
larger lot sizes is sanctioned and enforceable against already approved and recorded 
subdivision plats, it could easily "dry up the mortgage market for investors in platted 
subdivisions, could alienate title companies from insuring any lots therein, discourage 
purchase of lots, and long-range subdivision development, impale title law - years on the 
horns of a dilemma, and lead to a policy of accepting plats, only to sanction their 
arbitrary rejection, if one chooses not to build on vacant property within one year."9 
8
 Alternatively, even if the Hugoes intended at the time they obtained the fill permit to 
use their property for storing trucks or constructing a convenience store, they could have changed 
their mind, in which case a site plan would not be required. 
9
 The court does not mention the terms estoppel or vested rights in its opinion in 
Wood. It is arguable that Wood is much more of a vested rights case than an estoppel 
case further distinguishing the case from the one at hand. 
8 
The Hugoes accurately distinguish Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 
1980) on the grounds that the court found that no one from the county had led the owner 
to believe that his proposed use was lawful. Young, 615 P.2d at 1267. However, the 
Hugoes do not sufficiently distinguish the case of Maloof v. Gwinnett County, 200 
S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 1987), cited and discussed in Young, wherein the property owner had 
talked to someone in the county offices, informed the county of his intent to build a dog 
kennel and breed dogs, and was verbally given permission to construct a building costing 
$10,000. The court in Maloofupheld the trial court's ruling that the county was not 
estopped from seeking injunctive relief despite the alleged verbal permission. Maloof, 
200 S.E.2d at 751. See also, Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 (Utah App. 1994). 
Based upon the foregoing, the Hugoes fail to establish sufficient grounds for 
zoning estoppel and the trial court erred in concluding that estoppel should be imposed 
against the City. This issue may be reviewed by the Court under a correctness standard, 
giving no deference to the trial court's conclusions. Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 
836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah App. 1992). 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE HUGOES 
ESTABLISHED A RIGHT TO CONTINUE USE OF THEIR PROPERTY 
FOR STORING TRUCKS AS A NONCONFORMING USE. 
A. Standard and Burden of Proof for Nonconforming Uses 
The Hugoes note that Utah law has long protected nonconforming uses citing to 
the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408. Br. of Appellees at 12. However, 
9 
case law has made it clear that public policy opposes the extension of nonconforming 
uses and favors the ultimate elimination of such nonconforming uses. Rock Manor Trust 
v. State Road Commission, 550 P.2d 205 (Utah 1976); City ofGlendale v. Aldabbagh, 
939 P.2d 418 (Az. 1997); Lemon v. Speed, 694 So.2d 472 (La. 1997).10 In light of this 
penchant for the limitation and/or elimination of nonconforming uses, courts have held 
that zoning ordinances should not be given an interpretation which would permit an 
indefinite continuation of a nonconforming use, the extension or enlargement of a 
nonconforming use, or a change in a nonconforming use to a use of a lower class. Id.; 
8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §25.184 (3rd Ed. 1986). 
It is also well-established that the burden of proof in nonconforming use cases is 
on the party asserting the right to a nonconforming use. Morrison v. Home, 363 P.2d 
1113, 1114 (Utah 1961); Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah 1977).11 
Such party must establish the lawful and continued existence of that use as of the date of 
the enactment of the zoning law. 
10
 The court noted in Rock Manor, "[w]e are in accord with the State's thesis that 
there is a trend increasingly looking with disfavor to nonconforming uses." Rock Manor, 
550P.2dat206. 
11
 The court noted in Fillmore that once the property owner has established the 
existence of a nonconforming use, the burden of proof is reversed and the city must then 
prove the defendant violated the zoning ordinance by exceeding the established 
nonconforming use. Fillmore, 571 P.2d at 1318. It is the City's position that the Hugoes 
never satisfied their burden in establishing the lawful existence of a nonconforming use. 
10 
In light of these rules for ordinance and statutory construction regarding 
nonconforming uses and the burden on the property owner claiming to have a 
nonconforming use, the trail court committed reversible error, as more particularly 
described below, in finding that the Hugoes' established a nonconforming use, properly 
maintained such use, did not improperly enlarge or change such use, and that they should 
be permitted to continue such use. 
B. Nonconforming Use Not Established Under County Zoning Ordinances 
There is not sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that a 
nonconforming use of the property was established by previous owners or users of the 
property under County zoning ordinances prior to annexation of the property into the 
City in 1988. The ultimate answer to this question lies in the provisions of the County 
zoning ordinances in place at the time the property was used prior to annexation. Town 
of Aha, 836 P.2d at 809 (court noted that it is the zoning ordinance's classification of 
uses that determines whether a use is lawful and the courts must apply the legislative 
classification created by the county.) Despite the burden placed on the property owners 
to establish a nonconforming use, no evidence of County ordinances was presented at 
trial or is provided in the record by the Hugoes. The only evidence regarding this matter 
was provided by the City's Zoning Administrator Tim Stephens who testified that the 
County zoning ordinance required a site plan for the use of the property prior to 
annexation. Transcript of Trial at 127. Any acquiescence or failure by the County to 
11 
enforce its ordinances against previous owners cannot transform an illegal use into a 
legally existing nonconforming use. Utah County v. Young, 615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980); 
Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992). 
If this Court finds that the Hugoes failed to meet their burden of proof in 
establishing the existence of a legal nonconforming use of the property by previous 
owners prior to annexation of the property into the City, the property owners (old or new) 
would have no right to continue such use after annexation. 
C. Nonconforming Use Not Established Under Woods Cross Zoning Ordinance 
There is not sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that a 
nonconforming use of the property was established by the previous owners or users of 
the property or the Hugoes under City zoning ordinances after annexation of the property 
into the City. Once the property was annexed into the City, it was zoned C-2.12 R. at 
249. The property was later rezoned to I-l in 1992. R. at 251. As previously briefed by 
Appellants, the Hugoes' use of their property was not permitted under either the C-2 or 
the I-l zones as a transfer company. Br. of Appellant at 30-35. Even if their use of the 
12
 Property owners should have had notice of the proposed zoning of the annexed 
property and an opportunity to be heard regarding such zoning in accordance with State 
law requirements for the zoning of annexed property. Utah Code Ann. § 10-2-401, et 
seq. Regardless of assurances by the Mayor, the property owners should have involved 
and availed themselves of this process. 
12 
property is determined by the Court to be a transfer company, such use requires site plan 
approval which was not obtained by the Hugoes. Id.13 
D. Fill Permit Does Not Establish Vested Right to Nonconforming Use 
The Hugoes correctly note that the City does not challenge the trial court's factual 
finding that the Hugoes obtained a fill permit from the City. However, the City does 
challenge the effect given to that conclusion by the trial court. Issuance of the permit 
does not give the Hugoes vested rights to use their property in derogation of zoning 
ordinances or to make any use of their property other than that permitted under the fill 
permit; i.e. excavation and fill activities.14 The trial court's interpretation of the vested 
rights law set forth in Western Land Equities is too liberal. Western Land Equities, Inc. 
v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). A property owner typically obtains vested 
rights to develop property in accordance with ordinances in place at the time an 
application is filed. Western Land Equities, 615 P.2d at 396. However, a property owner 
holds his or her property subject to zoning and each level of development requires the 
appropriate permit or approval. Western Land Equities, 617 P.2d at 390. The City is not 
changing the rules of the game in this case. The Hugoes' use of their property is not 
13
 See also, the City's arguments set forth in Subsection (F) regarding the issue of 
transfer company and site plan approval. 
14
 See also language in Stucker, noting that money spent for acquisition of 
property itself should not be considered in determining whether vested rights have been 
obtained. Stucker, 870 P.2d at 290 (citing R.A. Vachon & Sons, Inc. v. City of Concord, 
289 A.2d 646 (N.H. 1972). 
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permitted (whether under County or City Ordinances) and therefore they can obtain no 
"vested rights" for the desired use under issuance of the fill permit. Town ofAlta, 836 
P.2d at 852 (a nonconforming use may not be established through a use which from its 
inception violated a zoning ordinance). 
E. Nonconforming Use Cases Distinguished 
The Hugoes cite the Utah Supreme Court case of Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North 
Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967) in support of their conclusion that they have 
established a nonconforming use of their property. Br. of Appellees at 14. This case is 
distinguishable. First, the use of the property by the plaintiffs for excavation of sand and 
gravel of the relevant parcels was a legal use of the property prior to enactment of the 
City Zoning Ordinances prohibiting excavation of sand and gravel. Gibbons, 431 P.2d at 
561. In the present case, if the Court rejects the trial court's finding of zoning estoppel, 
the Hugoes' use of their property for parking trucks is not a legally existing use prior to 
any ordinance change effecting any right to use their property. Second, the court seemed 
persuaded in Gibbons & Reed by the fact that the case involved "diminishing asset 
property" and that the nonconforming use to be continued on the property was a sand and 
gravel excavation operation in which the land itself is a material or resource and that it is 
not a site or location whereon the enterprise can be conducted indefinitely in 
contravention of the trend toward ultimate elimination of nonconforming uses. Gibbons, 
431 P.2d at 562. The Hugoes' use of their property does not have such a natural limiting 
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factor nor is the property considered to be diminishing asset property. In light of such 
distinctions, any arguments regarding financial hardship on the Hugoes and public 
interest issues as compared to such issues in the Gibbons case are distinguishable. 
The Hugoes next cite the case of Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 
617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980), for the contention that they have a vested right to continue 
their nonconforming use of their property. Br. of Appellees at 16. They also contend 
that the issuance of the fill permit strengthens such right to use their property for the 
parking of trucks and trailers. Br. of Appellees at 17. As previously argued, this 
conclusion is contrary to vested rights law in Utah. 
The propositions cited by the Hugoes in Western Land Equities are 
distinguishable in that the plaintiff in Western Land was a residential developer who had 
applied for approval of a subdivision permitted by current city ordinances. After denying 
the application, the City changed its zoning ordinances to prohibit the subdivision. In the 
case at hand, the Hugoes did not apply for, nor did they obtain, a site plan for commercial 
use of their property as required by City zoning ordinance. The Hugoes merely applied 
for and obtained a fill permit. 
Consider if the plaintiff in Western Land had applied for and obtained a fill permit 
from the City. The plaintiff then leveled off its land in accordance with the fill permit 
with the intention to develop a subdivision. The City then amended its ordinances to 
prohibit subdivisions within that zone. The plaintiff would have no vested rights in 
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developing a subdivision under a mere intention to develop a residential subdivision. 
Utah case law is clear on the point that vested rights for such development are not 
obtained until a completed application is filed for subdivision approval. Western Land 
Equities, 617 P.2d 396. Absent the filing of a completed application for subdivision 
approval, regardless of whether a fill permit was obtained or not, no vested rights are 
obtained to develop the subdivision. Id.15 For the same reasons, the issuance of the fill 
permit by the City in no way serves as application for site plan approval and should not 
be used to ratify or strengthen a non-existent vested right. 
This brings up a second important point. The Hugoes must submit an application 
for a permitted or conditional use to obtain vested rights. The filing of an application for 
a non-permitted use for a property cannot establish any vested rights in developing one's 
property in contravention of existing zoning ordinances. Town ofAlta, 836 P.2d at 852. 
Consider if the plaintiff in Western Land had applied for a commercial 
subdivision instead of a residential subdivision, which commercial use was not a 
permitted use in the applicable zone for the property. The City then changed its 
ordinances regarding residential subdivisions in that zone. Just by virtue of a change in 
the permitted uses in the zone, the plaintiffs would not have "vested rights" to develop 
the non-permitted commercial subdivision by virtue of applying for such a use prior to 
15
 See also, Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283, 286 (Utah App. 1994) 
regarding vested rights for building permit wherein the court noted that the date the 
application for a building permit fixes the applicable zoning laws. 
16 
adoption of the ordinance amendments. Similarly, the Hugoes application for and 
obtaining of a fill permit cannot establish vested rights to use their property in 
contravention of existing zoning ordinances or zoning ordinances in place at the time the 
fill permit application was filed. Town ofAlta, 836 P.2d at 802. 
F. City's Arguments Supported 
The City does not believe that its arguments regarding why the Hugoes have not 
established a valid nonconforming use on their property are frivolous or border on the 
frivolous as suggested by the Hugoes. Br. of Appellees at 18. The City has sufficiently 
briefed these issues (i.e. meaning of transfer company; site plan requirements; etc.). 
If any argument is frivolous, it is the Hugoes' argument that property may be 
automatically used as an "accessory use" to a primary use which is located two blocks 
away in another jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is contrary to the meaning of an 
accessory use which generally contemplates a contiguous and contemporaneous 
permitted use on the subject property. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.125 
(3rd Ed. 1991). Even if Hugoe Trucking is considered a "transfer company," they are 
conducting such use on their property located in West Bountiful. The use of their 
property in Woods Cross is not as a transfer company, but as a parking and storage lot. 
The Hugoes claim that Hugoe Trucking is every bit as much a "retail-type 
business" as a bus depot, wholesale ice store, dental laboratory, fire station, rescue 
mission, or other permitted uses listed in the C-2 zoning ordinance. Br. of Appellees at 
17 
18. While this may be true, it does not grant them the right to use their property located 
in Woods Cross for parking and storing trucks without also conducting their business 
operations from such property or without obtaining the required permits or site plan 
approval for the same. Take for example, the rescue mission use. Assume there is a 
rescue mission located in West Bountiful. The mission also owns a piece of property in 
Woods Cross on which it wants to store food donations and other equipment. The use of 
such property in Woods Cross would be considered a storage yard, not an accessory use 
to the rescue mission located in West Bountiful. Similarly, the Hugoes' use of their 
property in Woods Cross should not be considered an accessory use to a permitted use in 
West Bountiful. The trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that just 
because Hugoe Trucking is a "transfer company" that it can use its property located in 
Woods Cross to park and store its trucks. 
The Hugoes also note the trial court found that a site plan is not required every 
time a business property is sold and new owners use the property for the same purpose. 
Br. of Appellees at 19. The Hugoes claim that the City does not challenge this 
conclusion and employs unsupported hyperbole in place of facts to controvert this issue. 
The City agrees with the trial court's conclusion that a site plan is not required every time 
a property is sold to a new owner and the owners use the property for the same purpose. 
As noted by the Hugoes, nonconforming uses run with the land and may be transferred 
with the sale of the property. Br. of Appellees at 12. 
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The City does, however, object to the trial court's application of the legal 
conclusions and the law of nonconforming uses to the facts of this case. The legal 
premise concluded by the trial court necessarily assumes that the previous owner's use 
was a permitted use or a legally existing nonconforming use and that the appropriate site 
plan approvals had been obtained by the previous owner. However, if the previous 
owner's use required a site plan and the owner had not obtained such approval, the 
current owner (old or new) would be subject to enforcement action for the required site 
plan. The trigger is not the sale of the property but whether a validly existing 
nonconforming use existed at the time the property is sold and whether such use is 
continued unchanged by the new owner. 
In the alternative, if the court finds that a nonconforming use was established by 
previous owners or users of the property, the City relies on its argument that the use of 
the property by the Hugoes is sufficiently different from the previous use, eliminating 
any claimed right to continuation of the nonconforming use. Br. of Appellant at 32. 
Harris v. Springville City, 712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984) (change in nonconforming use). 
The Hugoes suggest that even if a site plan approval were required under City 
ordinances, they would be entitled to such approval if the Court finds they have a legally 
established nonconforming use. Br. of Appellees at 20, n. 1. The Hugoes cite the New 
York case of City of New York v. Victory Van Lines, Inc., 418 N.Y.S.2d 792 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1979) in support of this contention. It is agreed that some courts have held that 
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failure to obtain a business license or technical permits does not eliminate a right to a 
legally existing nonconforming use. 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.186 
(3rd Ed. 1986) (noting [t]here is lack of harmony in the decisions as to whether or not a 
use in existence at the effective date of a zoning law can be considered a nonconforming 
use where it was established or continued without full compliance with licensing 
requirements...."). However, such cases are distinguishable in that site plan approval is 
not a technical or business license permit, but is a land use requirement imposed for the 
protection of public health, safety and welfare. 
The Hugoes allege that the City has not established any "adverse hardship" if the 
Hugoes were allowed to continue use of their property for parking trucks. The City 
questions why such a hardship must be established by the City under any of the alleged 
theories. Nevertheless, the City's arguable adverse hardship in allowing the Hugoes to 
continue use of their property for parking trucks is the precedent that will be set in 
permitting them continued illegal use of their property without the establishment of a 
valid nonconforming use. Such precedent will have a significant impact on the City's 
ability to pursue zoning enforcement actions and will lead to further costly litigation 
regarding such matters (a cost which will ultimately be borne by the taxpayers). The City 
has or is attempting to pursue enforcement of its zoning ordinances against other 
property owner's in the City. If the Hugoes are permitted to continue their use of their 
property, other similarly situated owners may raise the same issues and will be permitted 
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to continue unregulated use of their property. Such a result is in derogation of this 
Court's recognition that nonconforming uses should be limited and ultimately eliminated. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Hugoes failed to establish a legally existing 
nonconforming use of their property and the trial court was in error in concluding such a 
use existed. This court may review this issue under a correctness standard, giving no 
deference to the trail court's conclusions. Town ofAlta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
797, 800 (Utah App. 1992). 
m . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AND APPLYING THE 
DOCTRINE OF ZONING ESTOPPEL IN THIS CASE. 
A. Vested Rights and Zoning Estoppel are Distinguishable Doctrines 
The Hugoes argue that the doctrines of vested rights and zoning estoppel are 
"virtually identical" and therefore estoppel should be "deemed raised" by the Complaint 
although not actually pleaded in the Complaint. Br. of Appellee at 31. The issue of 
estoppel and vested rights, although often applied to the same set of facts in numerous 
cases, are separate doctrines. Estoppel is an equitable doctrine imposed by a court when 
the actions or inactions by a local governmental entity induces a property owner to rely 
on such representations to his or her detriment and it would be highly inequitable to 
deprive the owner of his or her right to develop the property. Western Land Equities, 
617 P.2d at 391. Vested rights is a legal doctrine prohibiting the retroactive application 
of an ordinance or law when rights under a particular regulatory scheme are deemed to 
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The Hugoes cite the case of Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1987) 
for the proposition that a complaint may be deemed amended to include a non-pled issue 
if such issue is tried by the express or implied consent of the parties. Colman, 743 P.2d 
at 785. The test set forth in Colman for determining whether pleadings should be 
deemed amended is "whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and 
whether it could offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a different theory." 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 785 (citations omitted). In order to consider a complaint amended 
under this doctrine, it must be evident from the record that the issue has, in fact, been 
tried, and that the procedure was authorized by express or implied consent of the parties. 
Colman, 743 P.2d at 785. A trial court may not base its decision on an issue that was 
tried inadvertently. Colman, 743 P.2d at 785. Implied consent to try an issue may be 
found where one party raises an issue material to the other party's case or where evidence 
is introduced without objection where it appears that the parties understood the evidence 
was to be aimed at the unpled issue. Colman, 743 P.2d at 785.16 
In the present case, the City did not have a fair opportunity to defend against the 
theory of estoppel. For instance, if the City knew that estoppel was to be considered by 
the court, evidence would have been submitted regarding lack of legal authority of the 
mayor or zoning administrator to bind the City. Numerous other matters would have 
16
 See also, General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 
502, 506 (Utah 1976) noting "[t]here must of course, be either express or implied 
consent of the parties for the trial of issues not raised in the pleadings." 
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'"' ft should be noted that the court in Keller further recognized that because the 
trial court's determination of whether the issues were tried with all parties' "implied 
consent" is highly fact intensive, we grant the trial court: a fairly broad measure of 
discretion in making that determination under a given set of facts." Even applying this 
broader discretion standard, if required under the facts of this case, the conclusions of the 
trial court in considering zoning estoppel in this case should be overturned as erroneous. 
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construed in favor of the property owner." Br. of Appellees at 10 (citing Patterson v. 
Utah County Board of Adjustments, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995)). However, 
the same court in the same case also recognized the substantial countervailing argument 
that local entities are endowed with considerable discretion in determining the proper use 
of property within its jurisdiction. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 608. 
The trial court improperly considered the issue of zoning estoppel in this case. 
The consideration and imposition of estoppel is significantly prejudicial to the City. The 
trial court erroneously concluded as a matter of law that zoning estoppel should be 
imposed against the City based upon actions or inaction of the Mayor or Zoning 
Administrator, use of neighboring property, or issuance of a fill permit. The trial court 
erroneously concluded that the Hugoes established the right to a nonconforming use of 
their property for parking and storing trucks in violation of the Woods Cross City Zoning 
Ordinance. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's decision in this matter should be 
overturned and judgment should be entered in favor of the City permitting enforcement 
of its ordinances against the Hugoes. 
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